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Inequality and Indignation 
 
Edna Ullmann-Margalit* and Cass R. Sunstein** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Inequalities often persist because both the advantaged and the disadvantaged stand to lose 
from change. Despite the probability of loss, moral indignation can lead the 
disadvantaged to seek to alter the status quo, by encouraging them to sacrifice their 
material self-interest for the sake of equality.  Experimental research shows that moral 
indignation, understood as a willingness to suffer in order to punish unfair treatment by 
others, is widespread. It also indicates that a propensity to apparently self-defeating 
moral indignation can turn out to promote people’s material self-interest, if and because 
others will anticipate their actions. But potential rebels face collective action problems. 
Some of these can be reduced through the acts of “indignation entrepreneurs,” giving 
appropriate signals, organizing discussions by like-minded people, and engaging in acts 
of self-sacrifice. Law is relevant as well. By legitimating moral indignation and 
dissipating pluralistic ignorance, law can intensify and spread that indignation, thus 
increasing its expression. Alternatively, law can delegitimate moral indignation, or at 
least raise the cost of its expression, thus stabilizing a status quo of inequality.  But the 
effects of law are unpredictable, in part because it will have moral authority for some but 
not for others; here too heterogeneity is an issue both for indignation entrepreneurs and 
their opponents. Examples are given from a range of areas, including labor-management 
relations, sexual harassment, civil rights, and domestic violence. 
 
 
Every society contains countless inequalities. Some people have more money 
than others. Employers have authority over the livelihoods, and many daily 
decisions, of their workers. Some people are well educated, while others are not. 
In many nations, convicted felons are not allowed to vote. Many inequalities are 
found acceptable, but some produce indignation, which is a function of 
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perceived injustice. When inequalities do not seem unjust, they may be taken as 
unimportant, or else as natural, inevitable, responsive to “real differences” 
between groups, or in the interest of all sides.  
 
In this Essay we use some simple tools from game theory and behavioral 
economics to cast light on the maintenance and disruption of unequal 
relationships. We emphasize that such relationships are often sustained for a 
simple reason: It would be harmful, to the disadvantaged as well as the 
advantaged, to alter the status quo, and both sides are aware of that fact. 
Consider an imaginable system of sexual hierarchy, in which women are 
systematically subordinate to men, but which is to the benefit of women as well 
as men in the sense that both sides would lose if the status quo were changed. Or 
consider a system of labor-management relations in which a rebellion by low-
income workers would lead to depressed wages or unemployment. Or consider a 
capitalist economy, pervaded by large inequalities but complying with Rawls’ 
difference principle1: however large, the inequalities are (by hypothesis) part of a 
system that promotes the welfare, suitably defined, of the least advantaged. In 
situations of this kind, unequal relationships tend to be stable and self-
sustaining. Members of disadvantaged groups would suffer from a change, and 
they know it. Equally important, members of advantaged groups are aware of 
these facts and behave accordingly. 
 
On reasonable assumptions, change seems quite impossible. What will 
nevertheless make it occur? As we shall show, change will result when the 
disadvantaged feel moral indignation, which will, under appropriate 
circumstances, lead them to disrupt an otherwise stable situation by sacrificing 
their material self-interest for the sake of increased equality.2 To clarify this point, 
we will take advantage of some striking empirical findings from behavioral 
economics. Moral indignation—a willingness to suffer material loss for the sake 
of ensuring fairer distributions - is widespread, and it turns out to be in people’s 
strategic advantage if one condition is met: it is anticipated. Experiments show 
that when the disadvantaged are thought likely to sacrifice in order to punish 
perceived unfairness, the advantaged are willing to take steps to increase fairness 
- thus ensuring more egalitarian divisions.3  
 
                                                 
1 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 75–80 (1971). 
2 For an early treatment of this problem from a different angle, see Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The 
Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Pres, 1977). 
3 See Chaim Fershtman and Uri Gneezy, Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental 
Approach, Q J Econ 351 (2001).   4
Of course moral indignation, and a willingness to act on it, will vary greatly 
across populations. As a result, rebels face some serious collective action 
problems. We show that “indignation entrepreneurs” help solve those problems 
by signaling the appropriateness of indignation and the importance of acting on 
it. We also show that law can help, above all by virtue of its expressive function.4 
In exploring that expressive function, we emphasize four points. The first is that 
under circumstances of inequality, the reaction of the disadvantaged will not be 
uniform. Some people will be indignant, even outraged, and willing to act; 
others, while indignant, will be unwilling to incur the costs of rebellion; others 
will not be disturbed at all; others will be in between these various alternatives; 
and still others will be unsure about the appropriate attitude. The second point is 
that the beliefs and actions of members of disadvantaged groups will depend 
partly on the perceived beliefs and actions of other members. The third point is 
that different people will be willing to incur different costs for expressing moral 
indignation, partly but not only because of their uncertainty about whether an 
expression of indignation will be hopeless, in the long-run or the short-run. The 
fourth point is that in rebelling against inequality, members of disadvantaged 
groups face a collective action problem; some such members will be tempted to 
stay on the sidelines and to benefit from the rebellion of others. This problem is 
perhaps best solved through norms of solidarity by which indignation is brought 
to bear once more, in the form of moral pressure on free riders.5 Legal reform 
may be important here as well. 
 
Political actors on both sides know that law may help on all four counts, partly 
through what it does and, no less important, partly through what it signals. Law 
may, for example, dissipate pluralistic ignorance, fuel and legitimate indignation, 
and offer some hope for change in the future. Consider laws forbidding the 
discharge of union members or criminalizing acts of domestic violence: even if 
infrequently enforced, such laws can both fuel indignation and make people 
more willing to act on it. For their part, advantaged groups may enlist the law to 
offer the opposite signals and to produce contrary effects. Consider laws banning 
                                                 
4 See Amy Wax, Expressive Law and Oppressive Norms, 86 Virginia Law Review 1731 (2000). We 
owe a general debt to Wax’s treatment, which builds in turn on Ullmann-Margalit, supra note, as 
well as on Robert H. Frank, Passion within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New 
York; Norton, 1988). Our current emphases, however, are different from those in these other 
discussions.  
5 On the willingness to punish free-riders, even at one’s own expense, and on the associated 
emotion of anger, see Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 
Nature 137 (2002).   5
union members from requiring workers to join unions as a condition of 
employment. 
 
This essay comes in three parts. Part I shows why inequality is often stable and 
explains under what conditions people will rebel against it. Drawing on 
experimental evidence, Part II offers some remarks on moral indignation and 
spite and on the strategic aspects of the willingness to sacrifice material self-
interest for the sake of increased equality. Part III explores heterogeneity and the 
role of law. Here we move from the case of homogenous groups to that of 
heterogeneous groups, in which both moral indignation and the willingness to 
act on it are highly variable, and in which rebels face collective action problems. 
We explore in this connection the efforts of indignation entrepreneurs, the 
possibility of “indignation cascades,” and the potential role of law, showing that 
even without much in the way of enforcement, law can embolden members of 
disadvantaged groups and strengthen their resolve. We also show that, 
conversely, law can shore up the status quo of inequality, either by suggesting 
that moral indignation is unjustified or by raising the cost of acting on it. But all 
of these possibilities depend on the moral authority of law, and there are 
significant social heterogeneities  here as well. We discuss some of the dilemmas 
here for those seeking to use the law to transform the status quo or instead to 
entrench it. Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
 
I. Inequality and Partiality 
 
Our starting point is the situation represented by the following array: 
 
(2;1)  (0;0) 
(0;0)  (1;2) 
figure 1 
 
There are two equilibrium points here, the top-left corner and the bottom-right 
corner. As equilibrium points they are stable: once one of them is reached, no 
party gains by deviating from it alone. At the same time, the equilibrium states 
involve inequality, and symmetrically so: the value of the top-left box for Row 
Chooser is 2, as compared with 1 for Column Chooser, and the reverse holds for 
the bottom-right box. It is a matter of indifference at this initial stage whether the 
array is interpreted in terms of payoffs or of utilities; we shall have occasions 
below to note where it does make a difference. 
   6
For purposes of analysis, we shall assume that rather than contemplating the 
‘game’ represented by this array from the outside, the parties are already inside 
it, locked into one of its cells. Specifically, we shall assume that they are locked 
into the equilibrium that favors Row Chooser. The top-left cell, then, represents 
the status quo. We shall assume that while in the status quo, each party is aware 
of the larger picture. That is, each party is aware of the other three alternative 
states that could be reached were Row chooser, or Column Chooser, or both, to 
deviate from the status quo. In particular, they are both aware of the existence of 
an alternative, equilibrial status quo (represented by the bottom-right cell) in 
which their relative positions are reversed. This, as we shall see, bears on the 
strategic and manipulative aspects of the situation.  
 
A. Inequality Without Indignation  
 
From this simple description, and even with the stipulated information, it is not 
at all clear how the parties will perceive their situation. They might not see 
themselves in a conflict at all. Why? The answers are important because they 
shed light on the notion of indignation. Also, they help show how indignation 
might be stemmed when it starts to grow. There are several possibilities.  
 
1.  Negligible difference. While the status quo is asymmetrical between the two 
parties, both parties may regard the inequality as trivial, negligible, not worth 
fussing about. 
This attitude toward the inequality may be highlighted if the array—now 
interpreted in terms of monetary payoffs—were, say, the following: 
 
(100;99)  (0;0) 
(0;0)  (99;100) 
figure 2 
 
(Note that the gap between 99 and 100 is bridged by an “add 1” operation, 
whereas bridging the gap between 1 and 2 is ambiguous between the operations 
of “add 1” and “multiply by of 2.”) 
 
In these circumstances, people are unlikely to protest or to rebel, simply because 
the stakes are so low. There is no occasion for indignation. Many kinds of 
inequalities are seen in these terms. In some situations the advantaged try to   7
convince, or to manipulate, the disadvantaged to see the inequalities in these 
terms.6 
 
2.  Natural or otherwise real differences. The parties may think that the different 
payoffs are acceptable because they are a result of differences between them that 
are natural or otherwise real. Some people have unusual skills; they have 
benefited from the “natural lottery,” not itself taken as morally objectionable.7 
Biological differences might account for inequalities between men and women. 
Many in India accept the caste system as part of the natural order. An author of 
an untouchable autobiography writes that many untouchables “accept the notion 
of ritual impurity, the defining element of their own inferiority.” And he adds, 
“Our fortunes, good or bad, were the will of God.”8 
 
Even if differences are not natural, they might be taken to justify inequality. 
Famous basketball players and entertainers make far more money than janitors 
and secretaries, but perhaps the former have worked especially hard, or perhaps 
their relative wealth is justified in light of what they give to the millions of 
people who are willing to pay to see them.9 Inequalities might not seem so 
troubling if they are responsive to what are seen as real differences whose social 
consequences are not perceived in moral terms. Many people have, of course, 
argued for social and legal reform on the ground that morally irrelevant 
differences, whether or not natural, cannot justly be turned into sources of social 
disadvantage.10 These arguments can be taken as efforts to promote moral 
indignation when it would otherwise be absent.  
 
3.  Blind lottery. The inequality of the status quo, while not perceived by the 
parties as trivial or a defensible outgrowth of real differences, may be taken by 
                                                 
6 We bracket here the question whether the absence of moral indignation, on this or other 
grounds, is a reflection of manipulation by the advantaged or instead “adaptive preferences,” 
that is, preferences that have adapted to the status quo. See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
7 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 74 (1971). Rawls of course does challenge the justice of 
using the natural lottery as a basis for inequalities. 
8  See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies 198 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
9 This is of course the topic of lively debate. See G.A. Cohen, If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come 
You’re So Rich? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia (1977). 
10 See, eg, John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in On Liberty and Other Essays 471 (John 
Gray ed. 1991); Martha Minow, Making All the Difference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1993); Glenn Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2001).   8
them to be a matter of luck. Among the farmers in a village, some turn out to 
have the better plots; friends go together on a vacation in a resort and only some 
receive rooms with a view; some people do well in a market and others do not, 
for the simple reason that one set of commodities turns out to be popular in the 
relevant period; some people are drafted for military service and others are not. 
The parties may be well aware that the asymmetry could, in an obvious sense, 
have been the reverse. Still, their attitude to it is more appropriately captured by 
“tough luck” or ”too bad” than by “how unfair.” 
 
People perceive many real-life situations as if they result from blind lotteries, 
either natural or man-made. They often come to terms with the inequalities of 
their consequences, accept them and learn to live with them. Many disabled 
people, for example, come to see things in this way.11 But sometimes people do 
not find it easy to simply accept bad luck, and they become resentful. They may 
harbor ill feelings against the advantaged; they become bitter. Still, we take 
resentment as such to be free from moral underpinnings, and therefore to be kept 
distinct from indignation, which we take to have them. As we shall emphasize 
below, it is the indignant, not the resentful, who see the situation as unjust or 
morally wrong.12 Of course, resentment may, under certain conditions, turn 
into—or be manipulated into—indignation.13 
 
4. Taking turns. The parties may acknowledge the inequality of the status quo and 
regard it as unfair—but not permanently or irremediably so. Rather than become 
indignant, they undertake to do something about it. The simplest and most 
natural way of doing something about it is to take turns. Given that the parties 
are aware of the larger picture, they may arrange to switch at some point to the 
alternative equilibrium state, the one represented by the bottom-right cell of the 
original payoff array. But note that they can only do it by acting in concert. No 
one party acting alone can achieve this switch. 
 
It is worth recalling here that the original payoff array is in fact the one 
representing the well-known BoS game: the Battle of the Sexes (or: Ballet or 
                                                 
11 See Melvin Lerner, The Belief in a Just World (New York: Plenum, 1980). 
12 The distinction we are making here between indignation and resentment, while on the whole 
compatible with common usage, is stipulative. We bracket altogether well known philosophical 
uses of resentment (or ‘resentiment’) such as those made by Nietzsche, Sartre, Strawson, and 
others. 
13 For a series of case studies of this transformation, see Oppositional Consciousness  (Jane 
Mansbridgeand Aldon Morris eds.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).   9
Soccer?14). You enjoy it more when we go to the ballet; I enjoy it more when we 
go to a soccer match; but we both prefer to go together than to go alone. When 
the circumstances are right—a small number of participants, shared good will, 
and easy communication among them—then the parties may be motivated by 
the sentiments of fairness and reciprocity toward fixing the inequality inherent in 
their status quo. Such ideas as taking turns or switching roles are obvious 
solutions here. Within the family, strategies of this kind are familiar and have 
often been urged on equality grounds.15 Similar strategies have been suggested in 
the domain of political representation as well, with explicit reference to the 
notion of taking turns.16 Those who defend free markets sometimes argue that 
they produce a system, over time, of taking turns, with no entrenched 
inequalities, with widespread mobility, and with different people able to move 
toward the top of the social hierarchy.17 But of course here there is no explicit 
agreement between the parties to be taking turns: things just work out that way. 
 
5.  Mutual advantage. The parties may think that both of them gain from the 
situation, even if the two sides do not gain the same amount or in the same 
proportion. This may be the case when the disadvantaged see the present status 
quo as already an improvement, compared to a previous situation in which both 
parties were materially worse off (whether more equal or not). Workers may 
believe that their salaries, while far below those of managers, are made possible 
only by a cooperative arrangement from which, on the whole, they gain. 
Defenses of market economies, and challenges to legal efforts to increase equality 
within such economies, typically speak in terms of mutual advantage.18 Women 
may believe that they benefit less than men from a domestic arrangement, but 
that they still benefit, and that rebellion would be uncharitable, self-defeating, or 
worse.  
 
Of course situations of this sort may not remain stable in the long run. This point 
helps underline an important general aspect of the situations we are here 
concerned with, which is their dynamic nature. Our arrays “freeze” a time slice, 
and enable us to focus on its characteristics. But we should not be misled by the 
game-theoretic analysis and think of it as static; these time slices have a before 
and an after. Indignation first builds up, then leads to an explosive 
                                                 
14 Yet another playful alternative of this BoS game is ‘Bach or Stravinsky?’. See Ariel Rubinstein, 
A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, mass: MIT press, 1994, p. 15.  
15 See Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 170-86 (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
16 See Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: The Free Press, 1997). 
17 See Seymour Martin Lipset, It Didn’t Happen Here (1999). 
18 See e.g. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947 (1984).   10
transformation, and the new situation that is regarded as a beneficial status quo 
of inequality today may breed indignation tomorrow. With time, the 
disadvantaged may come to focus on the indignity of their unequal situation 
rather than on the benefits it confers on them. We shall emphasize that if this 
does not come about spontaneously, rebels among the disadvantaged group may 
labor to stir up the feelings of the disadvantaged in this direction.  
 
B. Partiality and Disadvantage 
 
We now come to consider the case where the party disadvantaged by the 
inequality of the status quo (but not the other party) does experience this 
inequality as objectionable, or at least comes to experience it as such over time. 
To preface this discussion, let us note that it is not always clear who is 
advantaged and who is disadvantaged by any particular status quo. Sometimes 
both sides to an issue consider themselves the underdogs under existing, or 
proposed, arrangements and laws. People disagree, for example, about whether 
and to what extent modern societies reflect sex equality. An especially vivid 
example comes from the affirmative action controversy. Some opponents of 
affirmative action consider themselves to be the disadvantaged, and of course 
many advocates of affirmative action think the opposite. Because judgments of 
unfairness are systematically self-serving, this should not be entirely surprising.19 
For our purposes, it is important to note that understandings of who is 
disadvantaged are not uniform within the population, can shift over time, and 
are even subject to manipulation.  
 
Still, as familiar examples of the sorts of oppositions that we have in mind, 
consider the following: employees and employers, poor people and rich people 
within a single nation, people in poor nations and people in rich nations, 
handicapped and able-bodied, homosexuals and heterosexuals, African-
Americans and whites, Arab citizens and Jewish citizens of Israel, untouchables 
and upper-caste members in India, Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland. We posit that if the inequality of the situation persists over time, and is 
not acknowledged as such and remedied by the advantaged, then the situation 
may breed, in the disadvantaged, sentiments such as anger, outrage, jealousy, 
spite, envy, humiliation, and vengefulness.  
 
                                                 
19 See Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-
Serving Biases, in Behavioral Law and Economics 255 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed.) (Cambridge: 
Cambrdge University Press, 2001).   11
The term “indignation” is here designated to capture this constellation of 
sentiments. Understanding indignation as righteous anger produced by a sense 
of wrong to oneself and to others, we intend this term to signal a morally 
charged sentiment. This sentiment grows out of a felt insult to the dignity of the 
disadvantaged, which is sometimes perceived as humiliation.20 To flag the rise of 
the sentiment of moral indignation, we shall speak of the perceived partiality of 
the status quo, instead of using the more neutral “inequality.” The status quo, 
then, is perceived here not as neutrally unequal but as morally wrong.21  
 
To help isolate the point we want to make, let us focus now on the following 
array (call it the extreme-case partiality array): 
 
(2;1)  (0;0) 
(0;0)  (0;0) 
figure 3 
 
This is not a coordination situation. There is here a single equilibrium point,22 
namely the (unequal) status quo: it has no counterpart at the bottom-right corner. 
So the status quo appears, from the point of view of immediate self-interest, 
maximally robust: it looks like everyone’s best choice in the situation. There is 
seemingly no credible threat for the disadvantaged to make, nothing strategically 
for them to gain but only to lose from deviating from the status quo. Those who 
rebel will sacrifice what little they have. And yet it is possible that even in this 
situation, rebellion will nonetheless occur. The reason is that if the inequality 
produces indignation, the disadvantaged may come to perceive the situation as 
one in which they have ‘nothing to lose but their chains.’ Of course they have 
something else to lose—the material payoff of the status quo—but by hypothesis, 
that material pay-off, though not worthless, is worth less to them than the cost of 
remaining in a situation of perceived injustice. Note that this analysis of the 
extreme-case partiality array begins by depicting it in terms of material payoffs 
rather than utilities. When indignation builds up, the disadvantaged derive 
disutility from the fact that they receive less than the advantaged. If we are now 
to “translate” this array to utilities, the upper-left cell would “translate”, say, to 
(2;-2) and the upper-right cell would perhaps become (0;2). The disparity 
between the two arrays helps explain the rebellion of the indignant.  
                                                 
20 See Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
21 See the treatment of the transformation of the Indian caste system in Kuran, supra note, at 323–
24. 
22 Or rather, only one strict equilibrium point. The bottom-right cell, with a payoff of (0;0), is a 
weak equilibrium: no one gains from deviating from it alone, but then no one loses either.   12
 
What this means is that even though the status quo appears, from the point of 
view of material payoffs, strategically stable and robust, it might yet be 
vulnerable to what we might call a desperate rebellion. This rebellion, if it occurs, 
is driven by indignation, not by a belief that it will have strategic advantages, in 
the short run or the long run. This is so even when there is no alternative status 
quo that is attractive—in terms of absolute material position—to the presently 
disadvantaged. To the extent that the disadvantaged may come to prefer equality 
of (or in) misery to perpetual partiality, the threat exists that they will wish to 
drag the advantaged with them into the gutter (so to speak). Consider the 
possibility that workers will engage in strike activity, knowing that they might 
well lose as a result, but willing to face that risk because of moral indignation 
directed against what they perceive as an insufficiently equal division of profits 
with management.23 “Let my soul die with the Philistines,” cried the Biblical 
Samson, choosing to bring down the roof and kill his Philistine captors along 
with himself, rather than to stay alive in captivity.24 
 
II. The Strategic Effects of Indignation 
 
Is it plausible to think that people will sacrifice their material self-interest for the 
sake of equality? Will this happen only under extreme and most extraordinary 
circumstances? Actually moral indignation frequently inclines people to sacrifice, 
by punishing, at their own expense, people who have behaved unfairly.25 This is 
a standard form of quasi-rationality.26 As we shall see, indignation may turn out 
to have strategic advantages, and in a way that bears directly on rebellion against 
partiality. 
 
A. Experimental Evidence 
 
To understand the operation of indignation, it is best to move from game theory 
to behavioral economics. Consider the results of the ultimatum game, a much-
discussed test of the relationship between material self-interest and moral 
motivations, in the context of proposed distributions of resources between two 
                                                 
23 See Michael Harper and Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law 94-97 (Boston: Aspen Law and Business, 
1999). 
24 Judges, 16, 30. 
25 In the context of labor-management relations, where anticipated shirking by workers deters 
wage cuts, see Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall During A Recession (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000); in the context of free riding, see Fehr and Gachter, supra note. 
26 See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (New York: Russell Sage, 1993).   13
sides.27 In the ultimatum game, some subjects, called proposers, are asked to 
suggest a division of a certain sum of money between themselves and other 
subjects, called responders. Proposers might propose a division of 90/10, 80/20, 
50/50—whatever they wish. But in this game, responders have a choice too: They 
can accept or reject the proposed division. If the responders agree to the 
proposal, players receive money in accordance with the allocation. If they say no, 
no one receives any money at all. Proposers are aware of this fact. No bargaining 
is allowed. 
 
The standard economic prediction is that outcomes will be extremely unequal—
that proposers will make offers approaching zero, and that responders will 
accept any positive offers. And if people care only about their material self-
interest, this is the set of results that should be observed. But the standard 
prediction badly fits the experimental data.28 Typically proposers propose a 
relatively equal division, with median proposals tending to be in the proportion 
of 60–40.29 Typically responders reject divisions that they perceive as highly 
unequal and therefore palpably unfair. Often they reject offers of less than 50–50. 
The ultimatum game is ordinarily played for small stakes, but the same pattern 
of results holds even when the stakes are quite large. The ultimatum game has 
been played for several weeks’ or even months’ salary in poor nations, and here 
too relatively equal decisions are proposed, and conspicuously unequal divisions 
are rejected.30  
 
All this is well known. But we want to draw attention to two less well-discussed 
features of these findings, both of which closely connect to our argument here. 
The first point is that responders are quite heterogeneous, in the sense that they 
will acquiesce with a diverse range of minimum offers. Only a small percentage 
of responders will accept an offer of 10–90 or less; most responders will not 
require a 50–50 split, though many do (typically about 35%); some people will 
not agree to less than 30–70, whereas many others will set a 40–60 floor (typically 
                                                 
27 For an overview, see Richard Thaler, The Ultimatum Game, in The Winner’s Curse 21 (New 
York: The Free Press, 1992).  
28 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 
1490 (1998). 
29 See id. 
30 See Colin Camerer and Richard Thaler, Ultimatums, Dictators, and Manners, 9 J Econ Pesp 209, 
210-211 (1995); Vesna Prasnikar and Alvin Roth, Considerations of Fairness and Strategy, 107 Q J 
Eon 865, 873-75 (1992); Robert Slonim and Alvin Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum 
Games, 66 Econometrica 569, 573 (1998). Note that the last paper shows that when repetition is 
combined with very high stakes, offers decrease somewhat, though they remain far above the 
standard predictions. Id. at 573, 588 fig. 3A.   14
about 60%).31 What does this mean? It means, first, that moral indignation itself, 
in the face of inequality, is variable; some people are offended by distributions 
that others find acceptable. It means, second, that spite, fueled by moral 
indignation, has a price, that it can be “bought,”32 and the necessary amount 
varies across individuals. These heterogeneities, and the existence of a price for 
spite, will bear on our discussion below. As we shall see, moral indignation, in 
the face of inequality, is generally variable, and people will vary in their 
willingness to incur costs for expressing it. 
 
The second point is that those who feel moral indignation, and who are willing 
to sacrifice material self-interest in order to punish perceived unfairness, actually 
turn out to be at a strategic advantage, because they stand to receive more 
generous offers from materially self-interested proposers. Or to put it more 
precisely: Those who are perceived as prone to moral indignation, and as willing 
to sacrifice to punish what they see as unfairness, will receive more generous 
offers from self-interested proposers, thus producing more equal outcomes.33 
This point emerges from comparing the results of the ultimatum game with the 
results of a simple variation, the dictator game.34  
 
In the dictator game, the proposer/dictator is allowed to impose any allocation 
she chooses; the responder/subject must accept that allocation. It turns out that in 
the dictator game, the median offer is significantly less egalitarian than in the 
ultimatum game. Still, even here divisions are not in the proportion of 99–1, but 
typically closer to 80–20.35 The far more equal allocation in the ultimatum game 
shows that the power of response matters a great deal, and that the anticipated 
                                                 
31 See Jolls et al., supra note, at 1491–92; Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of 
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J Econ Behav. & Org 367, 371-72, 375 tables 4 and 5; Daniel Kahneman et 
al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J Bus S585, S291 tbl. 2. The most subtle test of 
people’s willingness to trade  off fairness and absolute income shows similar heterogeneities in 
both the United States and Spain. Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social 
Preferences With Some Simple Tests (unpublished manuscript 2001) 
32 See the model of fairness in Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and 
Economics, 83 Am Econ Rev 1281, 1282 (1993), showing that the willingness to act to punish 
unfairness will increase as the material cost of doing so decreases. 
33 Note that while they received more generous offers, they might not be better off. Someone who 
receives 40 out of 100, and is willing to accept that offering despite feeling some indignation that 
he did not receive 50, might be worse off than someone who receives 30 but feels no indignation 
at all. 
34 See, e.g., Camerer and Thaler, supra note, at 213–15; Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments in 
The Handbook of Experimental Economics 298–302 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds.) 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
35 Id.   15
moral indignation of responders is driving a significant amount of proposers’ 
behavior in the ultimatum game. If rational proposers anticipate that responders 
will reject grossly unequal allocations, then proposers will propose more equal 
allocations, even if proposers are entirely self-interested. At this point the 
relationship to our concerns here should be clear: If advantaged people anticipate 
moral indignation from the disadvantaged, they should be expected to offer 
more equal divisions. 
 
This last point has received its most direct empirical confirmation in a 
remarkable study in Israel, designed to test the effects of ethnicity in the 
ultimatum game.36 Israeli Jewish society consists largely of two main ethnic 
groups, Ashkenazim (European and American immigrants and their Israeli-born 
offspring) and Sephardim or Eastern Jews (Asian and African immigrants and 
their Israeli-born offspring). How, the experimenters asked, do Ashkenazi 
players treat Sephardi players? The answer is that they treat the Sephardim 
better than they treat fellow Ashkenazi players, not because they like them more, 
but because they believe that Eastern players are especially likely to reject offers 
perceived as unfair. In the dictator game, Sephardim and Ashkenazim received 
the same amount.37 But in the ultimatum game, Eastern players were offered 
significantly higher amounts—indeed, almost 50% more than Ashkenazi players. 
In the authors’ words: “There is ethnic discrimination in the ultimatum game. 
Eastern players receive larger transfers than Ashkenazi players. This 
discrimination is probably the outcome of a common ethnic stereotype in Israeli 
society, according to which men of Eastern origin are believed to react more 
harshly if treated unfairly.”38 It is worth noting that in their capacity as 
responders, Eastern Israelis were not, in fact, more indignant and spiteful than 
Ashkenazi Israelis. The two groups did not differ in their willingness to accept 
unequal offers. The perception that led to more generous offers was not rooted in 
reality. But for purposes of ultimate outcomes it was the perception, not the 
reality, that mattered. 
 
                                                 
36 Chaim Fershtman and Uri Gneezy, Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental 
Approach, Q J Econ 351 (2001).  
37 Id. at 365.  
38 Id. at 369–70. A related interpretation of the findings couches them in terms of honor and 
humiliation rather than in terms injustice and unfairness. See Avishai Margalit, “A Just Peace or 
Just a Peace” (unpublished manuscript). The idea of indignation as here used covers perceived 
insults to honor as well as perceived injustice.   16
To be sure, there is much debate about the sources of moral indignation in the 
ultimatum game.39 Some evidence suggests that relative position is important—
that some responders simply do not want to have less, or much less, than 
proposers.40 Other evidence suggests that responders greatly care about 
proposers’ motivations—that if proposers are perceived behaving in a selfish 
way, many responders are willing to punish them.41 This view is supported by 
the finding that people are far more willing to accept unequal offers if the 
experimenter constrains the proposers’ choices, by, for example, saying that the 
proposer can only choose between 20–80 and 80–20; in these circumstances, 80–
20 is far more acceptable.42 There is also some evidence of cultural effects on 
outcomes. While members of all societies diverge from the standard economic 
prediction, the extent of the variation is culturally variable.43 Our main focus 
here, however, is on the fact of indignation and its consequences for outcomes. 
We have seen that when people are indignant, they are liable to sacrifice material 
self-interest to promote what they see as increased fairness; and that when 
indignation is anticipated, and when it is backed by strategic ability to punish 
people in a position of power, those in that position will allow for more equal 
distributions. 
 
B. Generous Offers and Redistribution 
 
Let us move now from experiments to actual practice. In the face of moral 
indignation, the advantaged have a number of options. They can take steps to 
fend off a desperate rebellion, or indeed to anticipate and fend off any response 
like that of indignant responders in the ultimatum game. The advantaged might 
attempt to convince some or most of the disadvantaged that moral indignation is 
senseless – perhaps because inequalities are trivial, or work to the advantage of 
both sides, or respond to real differences, or are a part of a system of taking turns 
over time. All of these strategies are familiar in various contexts. But suppose 
                                                 
39 For a good overview, see Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences 
With Some Simple Tests (unpublished manuscript 2001). 
40 This is the interpretation in Robert Frank, Luxury Fever 116 (New York: The Free Press, 1998). 
See also Dirk Engelman and Martin Strobel, Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin 
Preferences (unpublished manuscript 2001). 
41 Armin Falk et al., On the Nature of Fair Behavior, Ec. Inquiry (forthcoming). A more complex 
account emerges from Charness and Rabin, supra note.  
42 See Falk et al., supra note. 
43 See the overview in Roth, supra note, at 282–88; Alvin Roth et al., Bargaining and Market 
Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 362 (1991).   17
that these strategies do not work and that indignation proves robust. What might 
the advantaged do? 
 
As distinct from the case of ‘taking turns’ discussed above, we assume here that 
those seeking to maintain the unequal status quo are not motivated by 
sentiments of fairness and reciprocity. We assume that they are akin to entirely 
self-interested proposers in the ultimatum game, seeking to perpetuate their 
privileges if they can. To the extent that they perceive the threat of a rebellion by 
the disadvantaged as real, they may consider appeasing them by reducing the 
inequality of the status quo. In other words, they may consider redistribution—
the analogue to a more equal distribution in the ultimatum game.  
 
For purposes of exposition and without changing anything of substance, take  
the extreme-case partiality array (figure 3) to reflect material payoffs, and 
suppose the numbers are the following:  
 
(40; 20)  (0;0) 
(0;0)    (0;0) 
figure 4 
 
The advantaged may, for example, try to ‘throw a bone’ at the disadvantaged, so 
that the status quo will change into, say (39;21). Or they may offer a still more 
substantial redistribution by changing the status quo into, say, (35,25). Will this 
suffice? The answer depends on the nature and extent of the moral indignation 
involved. It is imaginable that the disadvantaged will at this point stop seeing 
the inequality as partiality and possibly come to treat it along such lines as 
“negligible difference” or “mutual advantage.” In the context of American labor 
law, relatively modest steps toward increasing union power have been thought 
both necessary and sufficient to secure industrial peace; the preamble to the 
National Labor Relations Act refers explicitly to the reduction of “industrial 
strife” as one of its purposes,44 a purpose that it has mostly achieved. It is 
possible, then, that an act of redistribution will defuse indignation, even if it does 
not provide equality.45 And might not the disadvantaged at this point consider 
that they already have something to lose by pushing further and taking the risk 
of losing everything? This is hardly unfamiliar; again consider the context of 
                                                 
44 See Harper and Estreicher, supra note, at 101–02. 
45 See Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights (New York: Norton, 1999) 
(discussing the provision of welfare, rather than equality, as part of a mutually beneficial deal 
among members of society).   18
labor-management relations, where self-interested workers often settle for much 
less than they deem entirely fair. What, for that matter, are the conditions under 
which literal equality (30;30) will be offered, or reached? In the ultimatum game, 
over 1/3 of responders insist on a 50–50 division46; in some circumstances, the 
disadvantaged will do the same. But is this the limit? Might there not be 
conditions under which, once the advantaged make concessions and are 
perceived as losing nerve, the dynamics will push things toward, say, (25;35) and 
even further?  
 
These questions are empirical in nature: what will or might or is likely to happen, 
under differently specified conditions. They are also a bit abstract, because 
people are typically complaining about a particular dimension of inequality (race 
or sex discrimination, for example, or an absence of certain rights in the 
workplace, or poverty), and not arguing for equality in general, whatever that 
might mean. But the important point is the recognition of the potential role of the 
moral sentiments in posing a threat to the stability of an equilibrium state: even 
though the status quo is robust in game-theoretical terms, it is nevertheless liable 
to being overturned by a resentful underdog.   
 
C. Turning the tables 
 
Let us at this point reflect on partiality as related to our original array (figure 1). 
Recall that it was an inequitable, double-equilibrium coordination situation, as 
distinct from the extreme-case partiality array where the status quo is the single 
equilibrium state (figures 3, 4). Here it is again:  
 
(2;1)  (0;0) 
(0;0)  (1;2) 
 
The point we want to make is that if indignation was thought to make rebellion a 
possibility in the no-alternative-equilibrium situation, then here the status quo is 
even more vulnerable to rebellion. But how does the existence of an alternative 
equilibrium, in which the inequality between the parties is reversed, affect the 
situation? 
 
The existence of an alternative equilibrium strengthens the threat to the stability 
of the status quo by making the threat strategic. To the extent that the threat of 
the disadvantaged to deviate from the status quo (from Column 1 to Column 2) 
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is credible, it is to the benefit of the advantaged to deviate too (from Row 1 to 
Row 2). The reason, of course, is that if the advantaged do not deviate while the 
disadvantaged do, they end up in the state represented by the top-right cell, 
where everyone’s payoff is 0, whereas if they do deviate they end up in the 
alternative equilibrium state, represented by the bottom-right cell, where they 
manage to cut their losses, with a payoff of 1, as against 2 to the formerly-
disadvantaged. Thus, the strategic structure of the situation in effect forces the 
advantaged to acquiesce in a table turning maneuver, which makes them the 
newly disadvantaged. Examples come from professional sports within the 
United States. Athletes now receive substantial sums, often many millions each 
year, thus reducing profits and apparently ensuring, some of the time, that top 
athletes earn more than owners and high-level officers, even though the converse 
was true in earlier eras. The tables have thus been turned, but without leading 
owners and high-level officers to leave the business.  
 
To be sure, when judged from the point of view of rational choice or game 
theory, the mere existence of the alternative equilibrium state, in itself, is not 
taken to constitute a strategic threat to the unequal status quo. After all, from that 
point of view it is contrary to the self-interest of the disadvantaged to deviate 
alone (reducing his payoff from 1 to 0) whether there exists an alternative 
equilibrium state or not. That is, from the game theoretical point of view it is 
irrational for the disadvantaged to deviate alone and risk losing everything. But 
what looks like an irrational move from the narrow perspective of the immediate 
self-interest comes to look like a credible threat when it is backed by the moral 
passion of indignation. Immediate psychological motives aroused by the moral 
sentiments turn out to augment, and at the same time to be backed by, a viable 
strategic threat. What we have here is passion in the service of reason.47  
 
D. Principle or Spite? 
 
Return to the array immediately above. As we have just noted, the threat of 
rebellion is augmented and made further credible by the existence of the 
alternative equilibrium state. But there is a further question: If the rebellion takes 
place and succeeds, and the alternative equilibrium is the new status quo, what 
exactly has been achieved? In the new status quo, the former disadvantaged are 
the newly advantaged, and we are once again in exactly the same sort of status 
                                                 
47 Robert H. Frank, Passion within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York; 
Norton, 1988); see also Amy L. Wax, supra note.    20
quo of inequality, with roles reversed. In theory, the analysis of the new situation 
is identical to the foregoing analysis of the initial one, though of course the 
history of table turning is likely to affect the attitudes of both parties in various 
ways. For example, the newly disadvantaged are perhaps more likely to suffer 
from resentment and indignation. Ethnic conflicts, with shifts in the categories of 
advantaged and disadvantaged, can sometimes be understood in these terms. 
  
But a more intriguing question relates to a somewhat different situation. 
Consider the following array (call it the equitable alternative array): 
 
(2;1) (0;0) 
(0;0) (1;1) 
figure 5 
 
Everything we said just now, about the threat of rebellion being augmented and 
made further credible by the existence of the alternative equilibrium state, holds 
here too: the equitable bottom-right cell is a coordination equilibrium here too. 
Now suppose that in this new situation a rebellion takes place and succeeds and 
the alternative equilibrium is the new status quo. What exactly has been achieved 
here?   
 
In the new status quo, the former disadvantaged have the same (material) payoff 
as before (namely, 1). So in the material sense they have gained nothing. The 
only difference is in the payoff to the advantaged, which now have 1 rather than 
the 2. With this shift, there is a problem about how to frame the point of the 
rebellion: Is the goal to achieve an equitable distribution, or instead to ensure 
that the advantaged are stripped of their privileges? The first may be seen as a 
noble principle, potentially with broad appeal; but the second might be seen as 
mere spite. Those seeking to perpetuate inequality often urge that there is no 
point (aside from envy) to moving from (2;1) to (1;1).48  
 
                                                 
48 See the discussion of envy in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 530-41 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), which has spawned an extensive literature. See also Frank, Luxury Fever, 
supra note, for reasons to think that even apart from envy, (2,1) may be worse than (1,1), at least 
if these are understood in terms of payoffs rather than utilities. There is empirical evidence  in 
support; consider the finding in Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social 
Preferences With Some Simple Tests (unpublished manuscript 2001) that when asked to choose 
between 400 for self, 400 for stranger, and 400 for self, 750 for stranger, 31% of subjects choose 
400, 400. Id. at 46.   21
At this point it might be well to identify some complications about the possible 
motivations of members of disadvantaged groups and about the nature of their 
indignation. Put in terms of utilities, the shift from (2;1) to (1;2) improves the 
absolute position of the disadvantaged, as well as their relative position. It does 
not, however, achieve equality. The shift from (2;1) to (1;1) improves the relative 
position of the disadvantaged and achieves equality, but does not improve their 
absolute position. People vary in what they care about most: absolute position, 
relative position, or equality.49 Which of the three do we assume the 
disadvantaged to be motivated by? The way we told the story, indignation is 
produced by inequality. But this in itself is not sufficient to disambiguate the 
situation and to tell us whether the disadvantaged in a status quo of inequality 
are motivated by a principled passion for equality as such, or simply by a desire 
to improve their position - whether absolute or relative.  
 
To get a sense of the variety of permutations of the three motivations, consider 
other possible shifts from a status quo of inequality. A shift from (2;1) to (5;2) will 
be acceptable to the disadvantaged who only care about absolute utility ("As"), 
but rejected by the relative- utility minded ("Rs") as well as by those who care 
about equality as a matter of principle ("Es"). People who care only about relative 
position (Rs), so that their real goal is to do better than the relevant others, will 
welcome a shift from (6,5) to (1,3): As and Es will reject this shift. For committed 
Es a shift from (3,2) to (1,1) would be readily accepted: here the commitment to 
equality is primary, even at the expense of absolute position. More pertinent to 
our concerns, a shift from (2;1) to (1;2) will please both As and Rs, but will be 
rejected by Es—while the shift from (2;1) to (1;1) will be welcomed by both Es 
and Rs but a matter of indifference to the As.    
 
In the cases that we are here emphasizing, the indignation-producing status quo 
of inequality was denoted by the canonical (2;1), and the shifts we considered 
were to (1;2) (in figure 1), to (0;0) (in figure 3), and to (1;1) (figure 5). We saw just 
now that pushing for these shifts may be variously motivated. Moreover, not 
only can we not tell the motives of the disadvantaged apart, but we also want to 
suggest that often the indignant themselves cannot tell them apart either. Or at 
least they cannot tell them apart at the initial stages of indignation and rebellion. 
Sometimes there is need to look to the subsequent social states in this evolving, 
dynamic situation, and to the observed behavior of the (formerly) disadvantaged 
in them, in order to clarify this question of motives. Thus: are these people 
content with the reversal from (2;1) to (1;2)? Or do they push further, until (1;1) 
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or even (0;0) is achieved? From the answers to questions like these, the motives 
of the disadvantaged may be disentangled.  
 
But the main point is that in all of the cases considered here, the shift cannot be 
achieved directly, in one move. In all of these cases, in order for the 
disadvantaged to achieve the desired shift they have to be lone deviators from 
the status quo, and thus they have to be willing to accept the state (at the upper-
right cell of all the arrays) of (0;0). Whatever else might happen next, this 
involves willingness on the part of the disadvantaged to sacrifice absolute 
position, a willingness to suffer—provided the advantaged suffer too. This 
willingness is the product of indignation. Whether the indignation is fueled 
solely by a passion for equality, or also by a desire to bring about the fall of the 
privileged, thereby improving relative position, may be impossible, or 
premature, to disentangle. And it may, ultimately, not really matter.   
 
III. Collective Action Problems and the Role of Law 
 
A. Two strategic problems 
 
Thus far we have been writing as if there are only two players, understanding 
each of them to stand for a group as a whole. Of course this is a highly artificial 
way to see most real-world situations. There is no reason to expect group 
members who face a situation of inequality to agree in their reactions. Some may 
be indignant and others not at all; some may be willing to act on the basis of their 
indignation, while others are not; group members may not be able to, or want to, 
act in concert.50 Recall here the great diversity of responder behavior in the 
ultimatum game. To understand the relationship between inequality and 
indignation more precisely, and to see the possible role of law, it is important to 
recognize that if they seek to rebel, the disadvantaged potentially face, 
simultaneously, two types of strategic problems. Specifically, they may face both 
a coordination problem and a prisoner’s dilemma-type (PD) problem.  
 
1. Coordination problem and indignation entrepreneurs. In order for their rebellion to 
succeed and for the social change to take place, many or most of disadvantaged 
have to deviate from the status quo together. If only one member of a religious 
minority complains of discrimination, little is likely to happen in response. If we 
assume, as we have throughout, that the two ‘players’ here are groups of people 
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(classes, population segments, and so forth) rather than two individuals, then 
obviously only if many act together do the disadvantaged have a chance to be 
effective. Of course it is likely to be the case that not everyone has to participate 
as long as a critical mass of participants is reached. But still the problem remains, 
of coordinating the deviating actions of a sufficient number of people to cross 
that threshold.  
 
If this is a genuine coordination problem, the interests of the parties fully 
coincide. To solve the problem, the parties need explicit discussion and 
agreement, or proper signaling or (what comes to the same thing) saliency. In the 
situation we are addressing, one of the coordination equilibrium points (and 
there are by definition at least two) has to be salient somehow, or signaled 
somehow. A pervasive question for disadvantaged groups is how can a signal be 
given? The question is further compounded because the coordination problem in 
hand actually entails a series of sub-problems. There is the difficulty of agreeing 
on a shared understanding of the situation (is indignation the right response?), 
and then there is the difficulty of agreeing on a course of action (is it worthwhile 
to incur the potentially high costs of acting on the basis of indignation?). 
  
There are various options here. An intriguing possibility involves the efforts of 
rebel leaders, who might be described for our purposes as “indignation 
entrepreneurs.” As diverse but salient examples, consider Thomas Paine, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, Yassir Arafat, Catharine MacKinnon, and Ward 
Connerly (influential opponent of affirmative action programs in California). The 
goal of indignation entrepreneurs is to convince people that indignation is 
morally appropriate and that the costs of expressing such indignation are worth 
incurring.51 The signals thus given may help to overcome the coordination 
problem. In providing those signals, indignation entrepreneurs sometimes take 
the special step of sacrificing themselves or (the extreme form of self-sacrifice) of 
becoming martyrs to the cause.52 Calling them martyrs, however, should not 
make us think that all such entrepreneurs deserve to be approved; there will 
always be those who will see them as manipulators or instigators. Here, as 
elsewhere, everything turns on one’s evaluation of their ends and their means. 
 
                                                 
51 See the analogous discussion of political entrepreneurs in the general category of extremism in 
Albert Breton and Silvana Dalmazzone, Information Control, Loss of Autonomy, and the 
Emergence of Political Extremism, in Political Extremism and Rationality 44, 57 (Albert Breton et 
al. eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
52 See Wax, supra, at 1744.   24
A self-sacrificing leader, dedicated to the cause of the disadvantaged, might be 
among the first to rebel in defiance of the status quo. Consider, for example, the 
actions of Martin Luther King, Jr., seeking to promote civil disobedience and 
often emphasizing his own willingness (demonstrated in practice) to go to jail in 
response for his violations. King’s frequent, highly publicized imprisonments 
represented a kind of martyrdom and hence produced a powerful signal, helping 
to solve the coordination problem by suggesting to thousands and even millions 
of people that civil disobedience would be justified and could be a widespread 
practice. If acts of this sort succeed in focusing attention on the cause of the 
disadvantaged, they may well ennoble that cause, fueling indignation. Moreover, 
they may in fact provide the signal for the entire group, encourage its members, 
and stir them to action. In the extreme case, the martyr’s act can serve as a 
rallying point or battle cry for them to follow suit en masse. In this respect this 
sort of self-sacrifice and martyrdom functions as a coordinating device.53  
 
Indignation entrepreneurs also attempt to alter behavior by promoting 
discussion among like-minded members of disadvantaged groups, in an effort to 
inculcate emerging norms.54 This approach is likely to work: It is well established 
that when like-minded people speak with one another, they tend to end up 
believing a more extreme version of what they antecedently thought.55 If rebel 
leaders succeed in engaging members of disadvantaged groups in internal 
dialogue, and in isolating them within enclaves of group members, coordination 
will be much easier. Indignation and the willingness to act on it are highly likely 
to grow.56 People typically learn from the informational signals given by others, 
and it is easy to imagine ‘indignation cascades,” in which B learns to be 
indignant because A is indignant, and C comes to share in the common 
                                                 
53 See the general discussion in Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
54 See Brett C. Stockdill, Forging a Multidimensional Oppositional Consciousness, in Oppositional 
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55 See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (New York: The Free Press, 1986); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy ch. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Sharon 
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56 For an emphasis on physicalsegregation and the rise of indignation, see Aldon Morris and 
Maomi Braine, Social Movements and Oppositional Consciousness, in Oppositional 
Consciousness, supra note, at 20, 29–30. Cf. Russell Hardin, The Crippled Epistemology of 
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indignation of A and B, and D, E, and so forth go along.57 Reputational pressures 
also play a role, especially within groups of like-minded people. We shall return 
to these points presently.  
  
2. PD problem.  
 
(a) In general. At the same time that the disadvantaged, as a group, have to solve 
their coordination problem, they also have to worry about the possibility of free 
riders. This is a particular worry for indignation entrepreneurs, even for martyrs. 
In a sense, where there is a martyr everyone else is a free rider. The martyr to the 
cause is the only one who willingly incurs personal costs, while all the others 
enjoy the fruits of his or her self-sacrifice if it succeeds, and lose nothing if it fails. 
A martyr cannot do all that must be done; for a rebellion to succeed, those 
engaged in the activities that follow the martyr’s sacrifice must solve the problem 
too. Assume, for example, that the rebellion requires certain acts – from verbal 
protests to civil disobedience - from which rebels might suffer. Because rebels 
face risks, everyone will be tempted not to join the rebellion but to remain on the 
sidelines. Of course moral indignation, spurring material self-sacrifice for the 
sake of equality, can overcome the temptation. And efforts to ensure discussion 
within enclaves, consisting of members of disadvantaged groups, can provide 
much help here. But we have emphasized that moral indignation will vary 
within the population of the disadvantaged, and also that the expression of 
moral indignation, for most people, has a price. Even when moral indignation is 
playing a significant social role, some people will refuse to join the rebellion. 
 
If the critical mass of rebels is reached anyway, then the non-joiners stand to 
benefit from the success, and if it is not reached and the rebellion fails, then they 
do not pay the personal price (legal or other sanctions) that the rebels stand to 
pay. The strategic problem of overcoming this temptation, then, is the PD 
problem that the disadvantaged have to solve in order for their desired social 
change to take effect. The standard solutions to this problem come from social 
norms and through law. In the context we are discussing, law is not highly likely 
to be available, because rebels are not lawmakers. Still, rebels may be engaged in 
legal advocacy; below we offer some examples of the sorts of laws that they 
might urge. Also, law is made by coalitions, and in many circumstances the 
disadvantaged might be able to form coalitions with sympathetic groups within 
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the broad class of the advantaged. In the United States, participants in the civil 
rights movement of the 1960s were able to obtain legal protection against 
discrimination in large part because they were able to enlist northern and 
western legislators to their cause. In any case – and this is our central point here -
- norms may have law-like functions. 
 
(b) Reputational sanctions and second-order indignation. Without law, 
reputational sanctions are a good way of solving the coordination problem 
through a new form of moral indignation. Those who fail to participate in the 
rebellion might be subject to indignation as intense, in its way, as the moral 
indignation directed against the advantaged. If non-participants face ostracism 
or ridicule—if they are treated as traitors, cowards, scabs, or Uncle Toms—the 
PD problem might well be solved. And indeed, rebelling groups often take steps 
to impose sanctions on free riders.58 We can better understand those steps, and 
the intensity of the feelings that underlie them, if we see that they may be 
indispensable to collective success. Disadvantaged groups often develop strong 
norms of participation and solidarity, making deviation from the group’s 
enterprise extremely costly for individuals. Such norms have often played a 
significant role in the labor movement. They can be found elsewhere as well, for 
apostates are often hated even more than infidels.  
 
Here moral indignation is playing a double role. It is aimed against the 
advantaged group, but it is aimed, with equal or greater force, against fellow 
group members who free ride on the actions of rebels. Notice as well that it is 
important to inculcate not only moral indignation against free-riding members of 
the disadvantaged groups, but also a form of second-order indignation directed 
at those who do not express indignation against free-riders. Thus, for moral 
indignation to do its work here, an additional free-rider problem must be 
solved.59  
 
(c) Indignation and its cost. For individual members of rebelling groups, 
however, there remain two problems: first, an assessment of whether it is 
appropriate to feel moral indignation and second, an evaluation of whether it is 
rational to act on the basis of moral indignation. We are assuming, that is, a stage 
in the rebellion when it is not at all clear whether moral indignation is sensible or 
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appropriate, and when there is heterogeneity on that count within the affected 
group. Many members of the disadvantaged groups may remain skeptical or 
ambivalent. One reason is that they are likely to suffer from pluralistic ignorance: 
They do not know what others like them are thinking. If people’s beliefs are a 
product of the perceived beliefs of others (“social proof”), this form of ignorance 
is a real disability. In order for the rebellion to succeed, much moral argument is 
needed on this count, alongside recruitment efforts, “consciousness-raising,” and 
more. At the same time, pluralistic ignorance is also an opportunity for strategic 
actors. Members of disadvantaged groups will have an incentive to exaggerate 
the extent and intensity of moral indignation, whereas members of advantage 
groups will minimize both of them. Here too indignation entrepreneurs can play 
an important role, as can deliberative enclaves and indignation cascades 
discussed above.  
 
Those who feel moral indignation will by hypothesis be willing to sacrifice their 
material self-interest to punish others; but how much indignation is required, 
and how much sacrifice will they make? Will they be willing to die for the cause? 
To put family members at risk? Here too we should expect a large degree of 
heterogeneity. For many people, incentives will matter even when moral 
indignation is real and significant. 
 
B. A Role for Law  
 
Both sides to the resulting conflicts are likely to want the law to be on their side, 
because of their interest in two key variables: moral indignation itself, which will 
vary within the population, and the willingness to act on it, which will also be 
highly variable, for some indignant people will prefer to suffer in silence. Of 
course the disadvantaged will want the law to legitimate their moral indignation 
and to decrease the cost of acting on it. The advantaged will want the law to do 
the opposite. Our emphasis here is on the possibility that laws, even ones that are 
little enforced, will have effects on norms and attitudes, so as to strengthen or to 
weaken indignation. We will also suggest that law, if enforced, can increase or 
decrease the cost of expressing indignation.  
 
There are many complexities here. For the law to affect indignation, it will have 
to have a degree of moral authority. Typically the extent of its authority will vary 
across the population, often with asymmetries between members of advantaged 
and disadvantaged groups. And a legal rule may have the opposite of its 
intended effects, by, for example, spurring indignation when it is intended to 
defuse it. Whatever the law does, astute indignation entrepreneurs will use the   28
law strategically. If it supports their efforts, they will invoke its moral authority 
to intensity indignation; if it attempts to entrench the status quo, they will claim 
that the very attempt is reason for intensified indignation and a testimonial to the 
rightness of their cause. For their part, supporters of the status quo will invoke 
the law to reduce indignation. This they will do either by urging that significant 
changes have been made in the interest of the disadvantaged, thus making 
indignation senseless, or by suggesting that if law directs itself against rebellion, 
its moral authority demonstrates that the rebellion is unjustified. 
 
            (i) Transformative Law 
 
The disadvantaged, or at least the rebels within that group, would like the law to 
solve their free-rider problem. The rebels will also want the law to recognize the 
normative weight of their claim, to reduce partiality to some degree, and to fuel 
the view that the inequality of the status quo, or the equality-denying practice to 
which they object, is a form of injustice. Success in achieving these aims might 
give their struggle a vital boost. If the law carries moral authority, successful 
legal reform is liable to turn it from a mere brute power struggle to a push for 
change that is perceived as just and right. Under the right conditions, legal 
support can increase the likelihood that the threat to topple the status quo and 
upset existing arrangements will appear something other than a spiteful and 
irrational move against self-interest. If the law is on their side, then their struggle 
will likely be ennobled: legal sanction can make the rebellion appear not for 
personal gain but in order to vindicate principle. Consider the frequent pleas of 
Martin Luther King, Jr.: “If we are wrong, then the Constitution of the United 
States is wrong,” and “All we are saying to America is, be true to what you said 
on paper.” 
 
But what might law do? The most obvious possibility is to outlaw a practice that 
contributes to inequality, not only providing sanctions against those who engage 
in that practice, but also in the process emboldening those who are rebelling 
against that practice. Consider civil rights laws in general, banning private 
discrimination in employment. The effects of these laws go well beyond their 
legal enforcement, whether public or private. If promotions and transfers are not 
allowed to reflect racial discrimination, people are more likely to object to 
discriminatory practices, merely because of the legal prohibition.60 These 
objections in turn have effects on behavior. By publicly advertising and affirming 
the rightness of the new convention, the law can increase the perception that an 
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existing practice is unjust, add momentum to private resentments, and provide a 
focal point around which players can rally and affirm their commitment to 
change.61   
 
Or consider the effort to see sexual harassment as a civil rights violation.62 Before 
the civil rights law was understood to forbid sexual harassment, there was of 
course sexually harassing behavior. But there was no concept, or term, to 
stigmatize that behavior, which was seen, socially as well as legally, to be a 
private matter, not a pervasive practice that contributed to inequality. In these 
circumstances, it was not hardly possible to be indignant about the behavior; but 
indignation was far more difficult. A central effect of the new legal 
understanding is to give both advantaged and disadvantaged a morally charged 
vocabulary that embodies the belief that sexual harassment is indeed a reason for 
indignation. The expressive effect of the law continues to be important. Many of 
those who objected to sexual harassment, especially but not only in the early 
years, stood to lose a great deal from the objection. This was and is so partly 
because lawsuits are expensive and grueling, and partly because those who 
object to sexual harassment are not likely to improve their employment prospects 
as a result. Actual and anticipated indignation played, and plays, a crucial role in 
reducing the extent of the behavior. (Recall the ultimatum game, where 
proposers give better offers precisely because they anticipate indignation.) And 
because the law supports that indignation, people are all the more likely to be 
indignant.  
 
In this way we can cast a new light on the contested idea that law has an 
expressive function63 – that law is important for what it says, independently of 
what it does. Sanctions, as well as costly enforcement, may not be necessary in 
order for the law to play a significant role in facilitating normative change. The 
expressive power of the law may well be sufficiently effective here. It may be 
effective, first, because it suggests that moral indignation is in fact appropriate. 
An important point here is that the very enactment of law will tend to dissipate 
pluralistic ignorance64: If the political process has chosen to forbid certain 
conduct, this is a good signal that most people, and especially disadvantaged 
people, object to it. 
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The law may be effective, second, if and to the extent that it increases the benefits 
and decreases the costs of acting on the basis of moral indignation. If a civil 
action is available for victims of discrimination, the benefits of that form of 
rebellion are increased. It is well known that in certain circumstances, 
compliance with the law will occur even without enforcement of the law; one 
reason is that when conduct is against the law, private persons are emboldened 
to sanction violators.65 The same point holds for laws that forbid discriminatory 
practices. Whether or not the government acts to punish unlawful conduct, the 
legal rule is likely to stiffen the spines of those who might not otherwise act on 
the basis of their indignation.   
 
Of course there are no guarantees here. The law might lack moral authority and 
hence the relevant expression may have little or no effect.66 In some areas of the 
United States it is not so important that the law forbids racial discrimination or 
sexual harassment. The relevant law is seen as an imposition from a kind of elite. 
The notion of “political correctness” has often been used to undermine the 
expressive effects of law founded on moral indignation; and one of the 
consequences of that notion has been to make people wonder whether moral 
indignation is in fact appropriate. Even if transformative law has moral 
authority, it might weaken the efforts of rebels, precisely because the legal 
reform, minor though it may be, may defuse moral indignation and encourage 
the disadvantaged to believe that the new status quo is acceptable. This effect has 
been observed with respect to what many see as modest gains, in the form of 
court decisions, from the women’s movement in the United States.67 
 
In short, the expressive effect of a transformative law cannot simply be read off 
the enactment. Such a law might be taken as a reason to stop a rebellion or 
instead as a reason to deepen and extend it. Indignation entrepreneurs will 
attempt to move social understandings in their preferred directions. 
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            (ii) Entrenching Law 
 
For those who enjoy or otherwise support the inequality of the status quo, and 
seek to protect it against upheavals, law might not be necessary. Private 
sanctions and norms may be sufficient. Employers might be able to fire 
employees who seek a larger share of profits, or even to unionize. Civil rights 
workers might be beaten or at least ostracized. General norms against 
malcontents, or particular norms in favor of certain unequal practices, may do 
the work of law. There is of course the technique of naturalizing the status quo, 
of making it appear unthinkable that it could be otherwise. Social norms and 
conventions, often religious in nature, are recruited for this purpose. Thus the 
inferiority of women, of blacks, and of homosexuals has in many historical 
periods been made to seem designed by God or by nature. The class structure in 
feudal Europe and in England until not so long ago was augmented in similar 
ways.  
 
Still, those seeking to protect the status quo may be expected to use the law for 
this purpose. They may, for example, seek legal authorization for the punitive 
steps taken against rebellion; they may also seek direct legal punishment of 
rebellion itself. As a prominent example, consider the effort to treat labor strikes 
as crimes or as subject to injunctions.68 In the same vein consider the early 
twentieth century effort to authorize employers to discharge members of labor 
unions,69 and the contemporary effort to enact “right to work” laws, which forbid 
unionized workforces from requiring new employees to join the union.70 If 
employers are allowed to discharge union members, and if the law recognizes 
that right, it might be harder, for some or many, to hold onto moral indignation 
against non-unionized firms: the law signals that indignation is misplaced. Or 
even if moral indignation is retained, the cost of expressing it has increased, as 
people may lose their jobs. Moreover, formal legal protections, backed by 
sanction, may be augmented by recourse to informal norms and conventions as 
well. In many workforces, at least in the United States, there are strong norms, 
encouraged by employers, in favor of rejecting unionization and union drives. 
One may expect walls of sanctions, both formal and informal, to be erected 
around the status quo.71 
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The basic goal here is to change the incentive structure underlying the situation 
in such a way that deviation from the status quo becomes – or at any rate 
appears to become – prohibitively costly. The price should be such that the 
notion that ‘I have nothing to lose but my chains’ becomes insupportable. In 
communist Eastern Europe, for example, dissidents were deterred not just by 
increasing the penalties on them for any subversive activity, but also by threats 
to the welfare and educational prospects of their children.   
 
In terms of our payoff array, the attempt is to effectively reduce the payoff for 
Column-Chooser’s lone deviation from 0 to, say, -2 (if not much lower): 
 
(2;1)  (0;-2) 
(0;0)  (1;2) 
figure 6 
 
Recall that the expression of moral indignation has a cost, for most people most 
of the time, even when moral indignation is intense.72 If the law sufficiently raises 
its cost, indignation is less likely to be expressed even when it exists. And when 
indignation is less often expressed, people who care about the beliefs and acts of 
others may silence themselves as well, potentially leading to a kind of spiral in 
favor of the status quo.73  
 
But here too there are no guarantees. In fact there is an interesting alternative 
possibility: If the law is perceived as grossly unfair, the very fact of unfair 
punishment may increase moral indignation and make some people willing to 
act when they would otherwise decline to do so. Consider, as a case in point, the 
effort by the state of Colorado, in the mid-1990s, to forbid localities from 
outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.74 By saying that 
localities could not treat that form of discrimination as a civil rights violation, 
Colorado was attempting to entrench a form of inequality. But did the effort 
actually serve to strengthen discriminatory norms, or did the opposite occur? 
There is no good evidence on the precise question. But it is clear that the law 
produced an intense public outcry on the part of advocates of gay rights. It is 
certainly plausible to think that the law actually strengthened moral indignation 
on the part of those who were inclined to object to discrimination on the ground 
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of sexual orientation. A similar point can be made with regard to laws that 
restrict the right to abortion. Just as transformative, or ‘un-entrenching’ law 
might weaken a rebel movement by reducing moral indignation, so an 
entrenching law might strengthen that movement, by increasing it. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Unequal relationships are often stable simply because it is in the material self-
interest of the less well off to maintain them. Change becomes possible if, as a 
result of moral indignation, people sacrifice their self-interest to produce change. 
As the experimental evidence suggests, it is not uncommon for people to show a 
willingness to lose materially in order to visit losses on those who seem to have 
been unfair. Real heterogeneity can be found, not only in the basic impulse, but 
also in diverse conceptions of when it is appropriate to be indignant, and in 
diverse judgments about how much can or should be sacrificed in order to 
express indignation. We have also seen that when advantaged people are aware 
that disadvantaged people are prone to express their indignation, even at their 
own expense, equality may be promoted as a result, simply because the 
advantaged (“proposers”) will be prompted to fend off rebellion by offering 
more equal distributions. We have extended these points to cases involving large 
numbers of disadvantaged people with varying levels of moral indignation 
(ranging to none at all) and with willingness to incur varying costs to express it. 
 
An ironic implication is that the more stable, strong, and immune to change the 
oppressive conventions and norms that protect a status quo of partiality may 
appear to be, the more vulnerable to change they may in fact be. This is so 
because under the right circumstances oppressive conventions are especially 
likely to breed indignation. And the more intense the indignation, the more 
credible the strategic threat of the oppressed to topple the status quo becomes. At 
this stage effective coordination among the disadvantaged may be sufficient to 
produce significant change. In helping to bring about such coordination, 
indignation entrepreneurs are likely to have an important role. 
 
Law can be important both in assisting and in preventing the rebellion. Law 
affects the two crucial variables: the extent of moral indignation and the costs of 
expressing it. If the law allows or requires equality-abridging practices, members 
of the disadvantaged group may be more likely to see those practices as natural, 
or as an outgrowth of real differences or as otherwise justified. If the law bans 
equality-abridging practices, more people are likely to be indignant about them, 
partly because of the moral authority of law, partly because the law can decrease   34
the costs or increase the benefits of objecting to those practices. Both the 
phenomenon of “compliance without enforcement” and that of “increased 
equality without rebellion” can be better understood in this light.  
 
By virtue of its expressive power, law can lend legitimacy to the moral 
indignation and hence increase the credibility of the threat to upset the status 
quo. Law can also play a pivotal role in providing a rallying point and thus in 
functioning as a coordination device for the disadvantaged. At the same time, 
law is contested terrain. The advantaged will press for legal initiatives that will 
give moral support to the status quo and raise the cost of acting on the basis of 
indignation. But legal victories on either side might turn out counterproductive. 
Such victories might demobilize rebels, suggesting that indignation is no longer 
appropriate. At the same time, legal repression may increase indignation, thus 
aggravating the very problem that the advantaged seek to solve. When moral 
indignation is on the rise, both sides, seeking to enlist the expressive power of 
the law, face some recurring dilemmas. 
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